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This rejoinder responds to criticisms by Jan Klabbers and Ino Augsberg of The New 
Legal Realist Approach to International Law (Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 
28:2, 2015). The new legal realism brings together empirical and pragmatic 
perspectives in order to build theory regarding how law obtains meaning, is 
practiced, and changes over time. Unlike conceptualists, such as Augsberg, legal 
realists do not accept the priority of concepts over facts, but rather stress the 
interaction of concepts with experience in shaping law’s meaning and practice. 
Klabbers, as a legal positivist, questions the value of the turn to empirical work and 
asks whether it is a fad. The rejoinder contends that the new legal realism has deep 
jurisprudential roots in Europe and the United States, constituting a third stream of 
jurisprudence involving the development of socio-legal theory, in complement with, 
but not opposed to, analytic and normative theory. 
 
Key words 




I thank Ino Augsberg and Jan Klabbers for their engagement with the new 
legal realist approach to international law, which was the subject of the last issue of 
the Leiden Journal of International Law that I organized and to which I contributed.1 
To recall, the new legal realism is part of a third stream of jurisprudence distinct 
from normative theorizing of law and analytic jurisprudence, that of socio-legal 
theory. Rather than addressing traditional abstract jurisprudential questions such 
as the concept of law (in analytic jurisprudence) or the relation of law to morals (in 
natural law theory and Dworkin’s interpretive theory), the new legal realism 
investigates three interrelated questions regarding law’s operation — how law 
obtains meaning, is practiced (the law-in-action), and changes over time. The new 
legal realism is thus distinct from both conceptualism (advanced by Augsberg) and 
formal positivist understandings of law (advanced by Klabbers) because it asks 
questions that these approaches do not and cannot answer. The different 
approaches are not opposed, as I explained in my initial article, and should be 
careful not to talk past each other. Augsberg and Klabbers assume the internal 
perspective of formal legal arguments before a judge. New legal realists, in contrast, 
apply an external perspective of how law operates in practice, including to inform 
our understanding from an internal perspective. Such an approach is useful not only 
for lawmakers who adopt new law, but also for legal practitioners advancing 
∗ Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law [gshaffer@law.uci.edu]. 
1 G. Shaffer, ‘The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law’, (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (insert number of first page).  
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particular cases under existing law. Such an approach contributes to our knowledge 
about law’s relation to social and political processes. Given international law’s 
expanding scope across domains of social life,2 a new legal realist approach is 
particularly called for today. 
New legal realism, especially of the American variant,3 brings together two 
key perspectives regarding law’s operation, one largely backward-looking (that of 
empiricism) and one largely forward-looking (that of philosophical pragmatism). 
The new legal realism thus stresses the importance of theory that is not model-
driven, but rather problem-oriented, engaging with experience in the world and 
purposive interventions in it through law. Empirical study is important, as 
pragmatists stress, because knowledge and learning develop from experience, not 
from a priori logic, and because decision-making should be grounded in such 
knowledge. Pragmatism is important for its understanding of human fallibility so 
that we are not trapped by our conceptual priors, and in its problem-centeredness 
since we have no choice but to use the best evidence available for our interventions 
in the world. 
Augsberg and Klabbers question the new legal realist approach from two 
vantages. Augsberg raises a theoretical question regarding whether there is a 
contradiction between empiricism (which he grounds in scientific realism from a 
philosophical perspective) and pragmatism (with its problem-orientation and 
distrust of claims of universal truth). Klabbers, a legal positivist, appears to question 
the usefulness of an empirical approach to law and legal questions, suggesting that 
the new legal realism is yet another academic fashion that will pass into the 
graveyard of fashions. 
Augsberg, in his response, Some Realism About New Legal Realism: What’s 
New, What’s Legal, What’s Real?, questions whether the two roots of the new legal 
realism—empiricism and philosophical pragmatism—are “mutually exclusive.” He 
suggests they are because the first is based on an understanding that “reality exists 
independently from our means of cognition, though we may not easily identify it,” 
and the second contends that “what counts as ‘truth,’ ‘objectivity’ or reality has to be 
analyzed against the functional background in which these concepts are used.”4He 
draws upon philosophically challenging lines of criticism leveled against empiricism, 
in particular.  
There are at least three responses to Augsberg’s contentions. First, one does 
not have to be a scientific realist, from a philosophical perspective, to defend the 
critical importance of empirical work. Second, the apparent tension was addressed 
by Quine who showed how, although material objects exist outside of our cognition 
2 See T.C. Halliday and G. Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders (2015); G. Shaffer, Transnational Legal 
Ordering and State Change (2013). 
3 See J. v. H. Holtermann and M. R. Madsen, ‘European New Legal Realism and International Law: How 
to Make International Law Intelligible’, (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law (insert first 
page number) and their Rejoinder in this issue. Although the American and Scandinavian variants of 
the new legal realism are distinct, they are allied in their interest in empirical study of how law 
operates, especially in their focus on how legal meaning develops and stabilizes as in Bourdieian field 
analysis. 
4 I. Augsberg, ‘Some Realism About New Legal Realism: What’s New, What’s Legal, What’s Real?’ 
(2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law  (insert number of first page), at (insert page 
number)___*2. 
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of them, and although our cognition is based on concepts that make any claim to 
truth impossible, we have no choice but to do our best to understand that reality in 
light of our experience. To again quote from Quine, "As an empiricist I continue to 
think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future 
experience in the light of past experience…. But in point of epistemological footing, 
the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of 
entities enter our conceptions only as cultural posits."5 
Third, and most importantly, Augsberg’s critique highlights the contributions 
of the new legal realism, including in relation to the old legal realism. For some, the 
old legal realism could be viewed as incorporating the social sciences, which 
themselves were in relative infancy as disciplines, into the analysis of law. The new 
legal realism, however, as Augsberg notes, places empiricism and pragmatism in 
relationship with each other. As my initial article explained, the risk of empiricism is 
scientisim, while the risk of pragmatism is relativism. The two keep each other in 
check. Pragmatism keeps us vigilant that our conceptual priors can be misleading so 
that we remainopen to revising them in light of new problems and contexts that we 
encounter. Empiricism keeps us vigilant of the empirical grounding of ourpragmatic 
interventions and aids us in evaluating them in light of their consequences.6 
Augsberg attempts to counter the new legal realism’s commitment to 
empirical study by questioning whether ‘reality’ is not simply a construction, and 
contending that “fictitious scenarios can prove more relevant and reliable and in 
this sense more ‘realistic’ than any so-called real thing.”7 To make his point, 
Augsberg turns to a famous Henry James story, “The Real Thing,” in which a London 
artist must make a series of illustrations of bourgeois figures for a book and is 
approached by a bourgeois couple who have lost their income but propose to pose 
for him as “the real thing.” He hires them but finally rejects them as models in favor 
of a Cockney woman from East London and an Italian male immigrant because of 
the greater suppleness of the latter in assuming the positions and attitudes that the 
artist wishes to capture. The moral of the story is that the apparently “real thing” 
may be less conducive for the making of representational art.  
Augsberg captures the moral of the James story but he misses two key 
aspects from a new legal realist perspective. First, what makes the story compelling 
is not its “moral” but rather its characters, a middle aged couple who have lost their 
material means and propose to be models and are willing to do anything in order to 
retain their sense of identity as a gentleman and a lady. It is not the “idea” that 
makes the story, but the compelling characters that underlie the idea. Second, and 
most importantly, law is not artbecause the context, stakes, and consequences are 
entirely different. As my initial essay stressed, for new legal realists, lawinvolves not 
just reason, but also power. Unlike art, law has material (shall we say ‘real’), 
5 W. V. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in W. V. Quine, From Logical Point of View (2d ed., rev., 
1980), 20; see also W. V. Quine, ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, in W. V. Quine (ed.) Ontological Relativity 
and Other Essays (1969) 69 (maintaining that our very thinking is constructed within a context from 
which it cannot be completely free). 
6 For further development of the argument regarding empiricism and pragmatic experimentalism as 
needed complements, see V. Nourse and G. Shaffer, ‘Empiricism, Experimentalism and Conditional 
Theory’, (2014) 67 SMU Law Review 101. 
7 Augsberg, supra note 4, at ___*2. 
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coercive consequences for individuals. The development and application of law 
recognizes (or fails to recognize) rights and duties, and potentially strips individuals 
of their assets and their liberty. The ‘real’ consequences of law mean something 
different for a person in prison or (in the United States) on death row than a reader 
of Henry James in a café, an armchair, or a bed.One can learn about law, society and 
power from art, but individuals suffer consequences from the application of law, 
including artists.  
 As a conceptualist, Augsberg questions what Andrew Lang (in his symposium 
contribution) means by “in part” when Lang writes, “the categories we use to 
apprehend the world are not natural but in part politically and socially 
constructed.”8 The “in part” is critical because, unlike an approach based on a priori 
thought, the new legal realism stresses the role of experience. It is the confluence 
and interaction of concepts and experience in the world that matter.  
When Augsberg turns to law he repeats the traditional positivist critique of 
legal realism that legal realism’s main claim is that “law is constituted by decisions, 
meaning judicial decisions. But as I explained in my initial article, the core interest 
of legal realists is not in the question of ‘what is law,’ but rather in the question of 
how law operates — how it obtains meaning, is practiced, and changes. When asking 
those questions, attention to legal decisions becomes important, although judicial 
decisions are just part of a much broader legal process. To understand how 
international law obtains meaning, is practiced, and changes, one must look to more 
than judicial decisions.  
Augsberg, writing from an internal perspective on law which stresses formal 
legal arguments before judges and judge’s formal reasoning regarding the law, 
contends that “rules, not facts, come first,”9 and that “law comes ‘after the fact,’ thus 
creating its own causes.”10 In both cases, he wishes to stress the priority of concepts 
in constructing reality. Augsberg’s remarks make clear the political and social 
dimensions of law, but not the priority of abstract rules themselves. From an 
internal perspective, a legal practitioner advancing a client’s interests has choices 
regarding how to present facts so that certain rules are applied as opposed to others, 
and so that these rules will more likely be interpreted in particular ways in light of 
the context. The lawyer and judicial decision-maker can select among facts to affect 
a legal decision, which supports the legal realist point. From an external perspective, 
law is a continuous, not a static, phenomenon. It develops through practice, 
involving the interaction of concepts and experience. 
The problem with Augsberg’s anti-empirical, purely conceptual approach is 
revealed in his diction. He uses italics to stress the importance of the idea that “the 
law presents itself” (i.e. that concepts are prior). But the law is not an agent and 
cannot present itself. Even before traditional courts,  law can only be presented by 
lawyers making arguments on behalf of clients who have interests, and by judges 
justifying their decisions in terms of what the law is and thus affecting those 
interests. These agents work within a particular institutional context so that certain 
arguments count and others do not. But those arguments concern not only 
interpretations of the law; they also concern characterizations of the facts to know 
8 Ibid., fn. 20. 
9 Ibid., at ___*6. 
10 Ibid., at ___*7-8. 
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which law to apply and how to apply it. Legal realists wish to understand these 
agents and their role in law’s construction, interpretation, practice, and effects 
within the legal field, as well as in the broader social world.  
Augsberg turns to Kant and Kelsen to contend that “different forms of 
cognition [such as the is and the ought] depend on different transcendental schemes 
and categories.”11 Here, some legal realists will raise an eyebrow because the 
material objects and consequences of law do not simply “depend on different 
transcendental schemes;” rather people are killed, raped, tortured, silenced, 
stripped of their assets, denied access to health care; they pay taxes, have their 
goods blocked at the border; some become ludicrously rich and others lose hope; air 
and water become soiled, causing cancer, or they become cleansed and people live 
longer and healthier lives. While Felix Cohen wrote about formalism’s 
“transcendental nonsense,”12 the same can be leveled at the privileged distancing of 
some postmodernist theory. And yet, at the same time, a new legal realist recognizes 
the importance of conceptual and normative thought and of formalist doctrine in the 
study of law and their interaction with experience. It is just that these approaches 
alone are insufficient for getting at the questions that new legal realists ask since, for 
a legal realist, knowledge comes from human experience, and concepts should be 
developed and revised over time in light of that experience. 
 In the end, Augsberg calls for a new concept of law that comes out of legal 
realist inquiry, one that is aware of its own limitations but nonetheless adds a new 
framework though which “‘empirical’ findings can be properly understood and 
integrated into the legal process.”13But for legal realists, a concept, such as a concept 
of law, should not come from theory alone, but from theory informed by experience. 
There is thus no trans-historical concept of law for all places and all time. Concepts 
are adopted and adapted because they are useful for purposes of human 
interventions in the world. Thus, such a concept cannot be derived by those (like 
Augsberg) who stress the “priority of conceptual thinking.” Perhaps a new concept 
will emerge out of new legal realist study, but it will be a concept that operates 
within a particular context.  
Let us now turn to Klabbers’ rather disenchanted, world-weary, have-seen-it-
all comment, Whatever Happened to Gramsci? Some Reflections on New Legal Realism. 
The main theme of Klabbers, known for his defense of legal positivism and distrust 
of interdisciplinary exchange,14 is not so much about new legal realism as about any 
new method, any new theory, any new academic approach to law, from Gramscian 
critical theory to the Yale policy school, which he views as fads that will “come to 
rest in the graveyard of academic fashions.”15At one point, Klabbers divides 
scholarship into formalism and critical theory, and appears comfortable with critical 
11 Ibid., at ___*11.. 
12 F. S. Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,’ (1935) 35 Columbia Law 
Review 809. 
13 Augsberg, supra note 4, at ___*13. 
14 See J. Klabbers, ‘The Redundancy of Soft Law’, (1996) 65 Nordic Journal of International Law 167, at 
168, and J. Klabbers, ‘The Bridge Crack'd: A Critical Look at Interdisciplinary Relations’, (2009) 23 
International Relations 119. 
15 J. Klabbers, ‘Whatever Happened to Gramsci? Some Reflections on New Legal Realism’, (2015) 28 
Leiden Journal of International Law at ___ *1. 
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theory because of its focus on theory and formal doctrine rather than experience 
and socio-legal inquiry. Yet his response about fads goes counter to a great tradition 
in Europe and the United States with which new legal realism links, that of socio-
legal theory. The new legal realism is not some fad, but has deep jurisprudential 
roots, constituting a third stream of jurisprudence involvingthe development of 
socio-legal theory—in distinction to that of analytic philosophy, reflected in legal 
positivism, and normative philosophy, reflected in natural law theory and Ronald 
Dworkin’s interpretivism. It may be that with academic fashion, there will be a turn 
away from problem-solving and our experience in the world. But the human 
demand for law, for the pursuit of order and justice, will require engagement with 
our experience. The new legal realism may, at some point, go under another name, 
but the problems and the approach will remain.  
When Klabbers turns to the new legal realism, his central comment concerns 
“what ‘empirical’ stands for.”16 Here he expresses a common misunderstanding of 
what empirical means, perhaps understandably with the turn to almost exclusively 
quantitative work in the “empirical legal studies” movement in the United States.17 
Klabbers first addresses quantitative work and then notes that at least one of the 
symposium’s contributors, Mikael Madsen, “often resorts to interviews” which “too 
counts as empirical,” so that “clearly the term ‘empirical means different things to 
different people.”18 Yet, the term empirical is not synonymous with quantitative 
methods. Rather, empirical has an accepted dictionary definition, which is 
knowledge derived from observation and experience, differentiated from 
knowledge based on theory. To take from two leading dictionaries, one English and 
the other American, “empirical” means (i) “Based on, guided by, or employing 
observation and experiment rather than theory”(New Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary, 5th ed.), and (ii) “originating in or based on observation or experience” 
(Merriam-WebsterDictionary). Quantitative methods are simply a tool to evaluate 
and understand experience, as are interviews with insiders, and ethnographic 
observation.  
Klabbers particularly critiques quantitative work, raising the challenge of 
‘aggregation’ which tends to flatten facts through their categorization; and the 
challenge of representation, quoting Benjamin Disraeli’s dismissive “lies, damned 
lies, and statistics.”19 I too, as a new legal realist, have critiqued the risks of 
quantitative analysis, as all empirical approaches. Yet, as the pragmatist contends, 
all knowledge is imperfect so that we should engage with empirical work, and not 
simply dismiss it in orderto build better understanding of law’s operation when 
applying, adapting, and reforming it. More generally, Klabbers appears to question 
the value of empirical work generally, to which the empiricist responds that 
decisions and certainties ungrounded in empirics are dangerous, unpredictable, and 
can have disastrous consequences. Witness the second war in Iraq initiated in 2003. 
There the legal justifications were based on false and biased factual claims.  
16 Ibid., at ___ *6. 
17 For a discussion on differentiating new legal realism from empirical legal studies, noting their 
overlaps and distinctions, see E. Mertz and M. Suchman, ‘Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical 
Legal Studies and New Legal Realism’, (2010) 6 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 555. 
18 Klabbers, supra note 15, at ___ *7 and fn. 32. 
19 Ibid., at ___ *6. 
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Klabbers raises the question of “what” the empirics should study, and notes 
that “empirical scholarship ends up concentrating rather too much on compliance”20 
and issues of high politics. For new legal realists, empirics should not be model-
driven (of interest to legal theory), but rather problem-driven (of interest to 
intervening in the world through law), and thus their focus tends to be on 
effectiveness, not on compliance. Such empirics can address any subject area, from 
human rights to business and regulatory law. It is the enlarged scope of 
international law across all domains of social life that makes possible a new legal 
realist approach because international law now implicatesalmost all domains of 
social decision making. Socio-legal theory thus must take greater account of it. The 
key for understanding the place of international lawinvolves much deeper questions 
than compliance, and includes the broader impact of international law on national 
institutions, professions, norms, and practices, as well as, in turn, the latters’ 
recursive impact on the development of formal international law.21 
Finally, Klabbers asks “cui bono?”22 What’s in it for whom? “Cui bono” is a 
fundamental question that a new legal realist asks about the legal system itself, but 
Klabbers turns the question on those who deploy empirical methods. I have three 
responses. First, conventionally lawyers think in terms of advocacy for clients and 
thus the strategic use of empirical work. Empiricists and pragmatists, in contrast, 
stress the importance of working to eliminate bias, even if it is impossible to reach a 
wholly neutral stance. This is particularly important when we operate under 
significant uncertainty regarding the reliability of our priors and the consequences 
of our interventions.  
Second, as Dewey insisted from the position of philosophical pragmatism, we 
should only have ends in view so that learning can occur, enabling what Victoria 
Nourse and I refer to as emergent analytics.23 In a world of uncertainty in which we 
must make decisions, decisions are likely to be improved if they are informed by 
experience. Certainly there are strategic actors who can manipulate empirics for 
particular ends (“lies, damned lies, and statistics”). But those advocating empirics in 
scholarship take a much humbler stance. Empirics can be abused and so the 
responsibility of the researcher is not to manipulate statistics to make a 
counterintuitive point to advancehis or her academic career. It is rather to engage in 
the world of uncertainty to uncover what is otherwise ignored, especially by the 
high priests of theory and formalism, not because the latter are irrelevant, but 
because they and their prescriptionsmay be all too relevant and seriously impact 
societies and individual lives. 
Third, I suspect (although such itself is an empirical question) that empirical 
work, on average, should bring to the fore the concerns of those who are otherwise 
less likely to be heard, starting with ethnographic work, but also more broadly.  The 
well-heeled and connected can organize to have their views reflected at the 
international level, whether they be countries such as the United States and China, 
20 Ibid., at ___ *8. 
21 See Halliday and Shaffer, supra note 2; Shaffer, supra note 2. See also G. Shaffer, ‘How the WTO 
Shapes Regulatory Governance, Regulation & Governance’, (2015) 9 Regulation & Governance 1. 
22 Klabbers, supra note 15, at ___ *8. 
23 V. Nourse and G. Shaffer, ‘Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New 
Legal Theory’, (2009) 95 Cornell Law Review 61.  
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regional organizations such as the European Union, or multinational companies 
such as Citibank, Disney, Shell, Siemens, and Tata. Those with few resources tend to 
be ignored. Thus much of my scholarship, building indeed from interviews, has been 
to learn from the experiences of developing countries and their stakeholders to 
inform debates that occur in Geneva and in the primary academic journals in the 
United States and Europe that tend to publish authors from the United States and 
Europe. Empirical research will often uncover the workings of power and bias that 
otherwise are not addressed by formalist approaches. 
Klabbers concludes by noting the importance of keeping lines of 
communication open. That is the way I opened my initial article and will conclude 
this Rejoinder. There is no one way of scholarship. Formal scholarship is important, 
bothfor advocates and judges, because it addresses judges’ internal perspectives in 
applying law that can have real implications on people’s lives. Conceptual and 
normative analysis is important for orienting our perspectives and our 
interventions in the world. And the new legal realism is critical for emphasizing the 
interaction between the experiential and the conceptual to understand how law 
obtains meaning, is practiced, and changes in order to inform law’s application and 
reform to advance human ends. As I began, what interests new legal realists is 
developing tools to understand and build theory regarding the development and 
operation of law so that we can more effectively pursue our ends, ends that must 
remain ends-in-view so that we are open to learning from our experience and are 
not trapped by our conceptual priors. 
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